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Individual retirement accounts (IRAs) were established in 1974 as part
of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act to encourage em-
ployees not covered by private pension plans to save for retirement.
The Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981 extended the availability of
IRAs to all employees and raised the contribution limit. The legislation
emphasized the need to enhance the economic well-being of future
retirees and the need to increase national saving. Now any employee
with earnings above $2,000 can contribute $2,000 to an IRA account
each year. An employed person and a nonworking spouse can con-
tribute a total of $2,250, while a married couple who are both working
can contribute $2,000 each. Current tax proposals contemplate sub-
stantial increases in the limits. The tax on the principal and interest is
deferred until money is withdrawn from the account. There is a penalty
for withdrawal before age 59|, which is apparently intended to dis-
courage the use of IRAs for nonretirement saving.
To determine whether IRA accounts serve as a substitute for private
pension plans, it is important to know who contributes to IRAs. Whether
they are an important form of saving for retirement depends on how
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much is contributed. In addition, the short-run tax cost of IRAs depends
on their prevalence. These questions have been addressed by Venti
and Wise (1985a) for the United States and by Wise (1984, 1985) for
Canada. The central focus of this paper is the relationship between
IRA contributions and other forms of saving. What is the net effect of
IRA accounts on individual saving? In addressing this question, esti-
mates of desired IRA contributions are also obtained, and these esti-
mates can be compared with results based on other data sources.
Ideal data to answer this question would provide information on
changes in all forms of assets over time. One could then compare annual
IRA contributions with increases or decreases in other forms of saving.
The set of questions that can be addressed directly with available data
is limited, however. IRAs were only open to most employees beginning
in 1982, and currently available data pertain only to that year. In ad-
dition, only limited information is available on changes in other asset
holdings in 1982. Given the data limitations, the goal of the analysis
presented in this paper is to estimate the effect that changes in the IRA
contribution limit would have on other forms of saving, as well as on
IRA contributions themselves. As explained below, other forms of
saving probably are best thought of as liquid assets.
Two central questions arise in considering the effect of newly avail-
able IRAs on net saving: the first is the extent to which IRA contri-
butions are made by withdrawing funds from other existing balances,
and thus explicitly substituting one form of saving for another. Pre-
sumably such substitution would be made by taking funds from existing
liquid asset balances, like other savings accounts. It is unlikely that,
in the short run, IRA contributions would be made by reducing non-
liquid asset balances like housing. A related question, although possibly
more subtle and difficult to answer empirically, is whether new saving
would have been placed in other accounts were it not for the availability
of IRAs, independent of existing balances.
Another question is the extent to which IRA contributions may ulti-
mately serve as a substitute for nonliquid assets. In the long run, indi-
viduals may contribute to IRAs instead of investing in housing, for ex-
ample. This question is more difficult to address empirically, and no
attempt is made to answer it here. Whether IRA contributions were sub-
stituted for other liquid assets in 1982 is the question that can be most
directly addressed using the available data. But we believe that the es-
timates may also provide a reasonable indication of the trade-off between
IRA contributions and liquid assets in the long run as well. The spirit of
the paper is to distinguish direct evidence about which the results are likely
to be relatively robust from questions about which the evidence is only
indirect. An attempt is made to draw inferences based on the weight of
the evidence. In short, given the available data and their limitations, what
can be said about the effect of IRAs on net individual saving?IRAs and Saving
Background data on IRA contributions and other wealth holdings are
presented in section 1.1. The model used for estimation is developed in
section 1.2. Its key feature is constrained optimization, with the limit on
IRA contributions the primary constraint. The principle goal is to obtain
estimates of the effect of changes in IRA limits on other saving, as well
as on IRA contributions themselves. The model addresses the allocation
of current income. This approach has been chosen over a model of pre-
sumed lifetime saving behavior, although the allocation of current income
could be thought of as the reduced form of a life-cycle model. In addition,
estimates of the allocation of current income based on age and other per-
sonal attributes allow inferences about life-cycle saving behavior.
The results are presented in section 1.3. The emphasis is on the
sensitivity of the results to model specification and to the interpretation
of a key variable, "savings and reserve funds." The most important
results are presented in the form of simulations of the effect of proposed
limit changes on IRA contributions and other saving. Some of the
results developed here can be compared with evidence based on other
data sources. Comparable evidence on IRA contributions for 1982 has
been developed by Venti and Wise (1985), based on Current Population
Survey data. The results of the present paper are based on the 1983
Survey of Consumer Finances (SCF), which presents information on
IRAs in 1982. Section 1.4 presents a summary of the findings and
concluding discussion.
1.1. Descriptive Statistics
About 16% of wage earner families have IRA accounts, as shown in
table l.l.
1 Few families with incomes under $10,000 have them and
only about 7% of families with incomes between $10,000 and $20,000














































































Note: The data are weighted to be representative of all families. The total sample size
for this table is 3,205.10 Steven F. Venti and David A. Wise
contribute to IRAs.
2 But because there are relatively few families with
incomes greater than $50,000, almost 70% of contributor families have
incomes below that level. As shown in Venti and Wise (1985), about
90% of individual wage earners who contribute have incomes less than
$50,000. The distribution of contributor families by income interval is
as follows:









Older persons are considerably more likely than younger ones to
contribute, although the proportion drops at age 65, when a large pro-
portion of employees retire. For example, among families in the $20,000
to $30,000 income interval, 36% of those 55 to 64 contributed but only
11% of those aged 25 to 34.
The subsequent analysis will rely in part on responses to a question
that asked: "Considering all of your savings and reserve funds, overall,
did you put more money in or take more money out in 1982?"
3 The
precise interpretation that should be assigned the responses is unclear.
In particular, it is not clear whether savings and reserve funds include
or exclude IRA contributions. The analysis is conducted and the results
are evaluated using both interpretations, although we believe it is most
plausible to assume that IRAs are excluded. We presume that responses
do not reflect nonliquid assets like housing. The proportion of families
indicating an increase in "savings and reserve funds" is shown in table
1.2. Only 32% of respondents indicated an increase in 1982, while the
remainder indicated a decrease or no change.
4 The proportion indi-
cating an increase rises markedly with income, but shows little rela-
tionship to age.
A key consideration in our analysis is the relationship between IRA
contributions and the change in "savings and reserve funds." Suppose
IRA contributions were typically taken from "savings and reserve funds"
balances. If savings and reserve funds included IRAs, there would be
no change in overall savings and reserve funds. If the latter were in-
terpreted to exclude IRAs, contributions to IRAs should be associated
with a decline in savings and reserve funds. Apparently neither is true.
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Note: The data are weighted to be representative of all families. The total sample size
for this table is 3,208.
Table 1.3 Proportion of IRA Contributors with Increase in "Savings and
Reserve Funds," Divided by Proportion of Noncontributors with




































































Note: Not reported for cells in which there were fewer than 8 IRA contributors.
increase than those who don't. The ratio of the proportion of IRA
contributors with an increase in "savings and reserve funds" to the
proportion of noncontributors with an increase is shown in table 1.3,
by income and age. Overall, contributors are more than twice as likely
as noncontributors to indicate an increase, although this number re-
flects in part different distributions of contributors and noncontributors
by income and age. The average of the cell ratios is 1.77.
Thus these numbers suggest that there are savers and nonsavers and
that savers save both through IRAs and through other forms; the pos-
itive relationship reflects an individual-specific effect. The subsequent
analysis provides support for an individual-specific savings effect, while
also suggesting a substantial positive effect of IRAs on net individual
saving.12 Steven F. Venti and David A. Wise
To put IRA contributions in perspective and to help to interpret the
analysis below, it is useful to have in mind the magnitude of individual
wealth holdings. The median wealth of persons in the sample is $22,900,
excluding pensions and Social Security wealth.
5 Even among persons
55 to 64, the median is only $55,000 (see table 1.4). Most of this wealth
is nonliquid, the preponderance of which is housing. Consistent with
other evidence (e.g., Hurd and Shoven [1985], Beraheim [1984], Dia-
mond and Hausman [1984]), a large proportion of individuals have very
little nonhousing wealth; they save very little. Median liquid assets,
excluding stocks and bonds, are shown in table 1.5, by income and
age. The median for all families is $1,200. For families earning $30,000
to $40,000 with a head 45 to 54 years it is only $4,600. While most
people have some liquid assets, only about 20% have financial assets
in the form of stocks or bonds.
6 Thus it is clear that most people have














































































weighted to be representative of all families. The total sample size
















































































Note: Stocks and bonds are excluded. The data are weighted to be representative of all
families. The total sample size for this table is 2,729.13 IRAs and Saving
not been accumulating financial assets at a rate close to the $2,000 per
year that an IRA allows.
The median wealth of IRA contributors divided by the median wealth
of noncontributors, by income and age, is shown in table 1.6. Con-
tributors have substantially higher wealth on average. The average of
the cell ratios is 1.50.
7 The analysis below, however, indicates that after
controlling for other variables, total wealth is in fact negatively related
to IRA contributions. The results, including detail by liquid versus
nonliquid wealth, suggest that the numbers in table 1.6 also reflect
individual-specific saving effects; some people are savers, others are
not.
In summary: the descriptive data confirm that low-income persons
are unlikely to contribute to IRAs. But they provide no direct evidence
that IRA contributions are offset by reductions in other forms of saving;
persons who contribute to IRAs are more likely than those who do not
to indicate an overall increase in savings and reserve funds. The de-
scriptive data, however, do not reveal whether savers save more be-
cause of the IRA option. The subsequent analysis is intended to shed
light on this issue.
1.2 Allocation of Income: Individual Saving and IRA Constraints
Given the limitations of the data, the goal is to develop a statistical
model that will allow inferences based on the information that is avail-
able. The approach is to consider the allocation of current income in
the spirit of expenditure studies, but with concentration on what is not
spent for current consumption. The key feature of the approach is to
incorporate the limit on tax-deferred saving in the estimation procedure









































































Note: Not reported for cells in which there were fewer than 8 IRA contributors.14 Steven F. Venti and David A. Wise
would change if the limit were changed. To assure that estimated con-
strained and unconstrained behavior are internally consistent, the func-
tional forms of the estimated equations are related through an under-
lying decision function. The model is intended to be "structural" with
respect to changes in the IRA limit although, as explained below, not
necessarily with respect to the individual variables that are used to
estimate choice parameters of individuals. We begin with a simple
example and then present the specifications used for estimation. For
expository purposes, we also discuss first a specification that implies
only a limited form of substitution between IRA and other saving. We
then present a model that allows more flexible substitution and that
incorporates the first as a special case.
1.2.1 A Simple Example
Suppose that current income Y can be allocated to tax-deferred IRA
saving Su to other forms of saving S2, or to current uses, Y — Si —
S2. Assume also that were there no limit on 51} or if persons were not
constrained by the limit, observed levels of St and S2 would be fit by
the functions
(1) Si = bxY, and
S2 = b2Y.
For estimation, we need also to consider saving functions that are
consistent with these, but for persons who are constrained by the limit
on Si. These may be obtained by considering an underlying decision
function that is consistent with observed saving decisions.
The saving allocations in (1) are in accordance with the decision
function





where bt and b2 are parameters. Maximization of (2) with respect to
Si and S2 yields (1). The presumption is that the &'s depend on measured
personal attributes like age, income, wealth, education, marital status;
unmeasured attributes that affect saving behavior in general; and un-
measured attributes like expected future liquidity needs or attitude
toward risk that may affect the preferred allocation of income to Si,
versus S2. This specification treats IRAs and other forms of saving as
different "goods," thus emphasizing nonprice differences between the
two forms of saving. In particular, because of the early withdrawal
penalty that makes IRAs less liquid than other saving, they may tend
to be more narrowly targeted to retirement consumption; much of
saving in other forms may be for different and more short term pur-
poses. The "price" difference between the two forms of saving is15 IRAs and Saving
brought out below. Following the decision function (2), if 5, cannot
exceed the limit L, the saving functions are
*,y if *,F<L,
(3) 5, = «
L if*,F>£,
2Y if *,F<L ,
5, = «{ h
-V(r-L)if*,r>L.
The relationship between income and 52 saving depends on whether
the limit on the tax-deferred 5, saving has been reached. In the sub-
sequent discussion, we shall begin with a decision function, but it
should be understood that it is chosen to be consistent with observed
saving decisions. It is a construct that assures that constrained and
unconstrained savings functions are consistent with each other.
It will be important to estimate the change in S2 with a change in
the limit L. In this case dS2ldL = -*2/(l - *i), depending only on
the *'s. Thus to obtain good estimates of the effect of limit changes,
it is necessary only to have good estimates of these parameters; not
necessarily of the effect on the *'s of the variables that will be used
to estimate them. Figure 1.1 describes graphically the relationship be-
tween income and 5, and S2, with particular reference to the estimated
specification described in section 1.2.2 below.
1.2.2 The Estimated Model: A Special Case
In practice, S2 could be negative. "Desired" 5, could also be neg-
ative, although not its observed value. Previous work by Venti and
Wise (1985a) and by Wise (1985) indicates that IRA contributions alone
can be described well by a Tobit specification with limits at zero and
L.
8 In addition, the cost of one dollar of 5, in terms of current con-
sumption is (1 - t), where t is the marginal tax rate, whereas the cost
of 52is 1.
A decision function and implicit budget constraint that incorporates
these characteristics is
(4) V=[Y- T- 5,(1 - t) - 52p-*2-b2 [5, - fll]*i [52 - a2f\
The presumption is that if both 5, and 52 were zero, current con-
sumption would be Y — T, where Tis total taxes. This amount serves
as the base case. If IRA contributions 5, are made, taxes are reduced
by tSx.
9 In practice, "current consumption" includes some forms of
saving like housing since the variable used to describe 52 does not
reflect all forms of non-IRA saving.
1
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Figure 1.1 Savings versus after-tax income
Consistent with (4), the "desired" level of tax-deferred saving St is
given by
bx (5a) Sx = ax + _
and the observed level S! by
[(Y-T)- (I- fla, - a2] ,
(5b)
0 if 5, ^ 0 ,
Sj ifO < St <L ,
L if L < Si .
Non-tax-deferred saving is given by
(6)
a2 + r^V [(Y-T)- flJ if 5! < 0 ,
a2 + b2[(Y - T) - ax (1 - i) - a2] if 0 < Sx < L ,
a2 + -^-r- [(Y-T)- L(\ - t) - a2] if 5, > L .
Stylized versions of the Sx and S2 functions are graphed in figure 1.1,
where (Y - T)* is the after-tax income level at which the limit L on
Si is reached.17 IRAs and Saving
For expositional purposes, an advantage of the specification de-
scribed above is that a closed-form solution to the constrained saving
function can be obtained from the decision function. This is not always
the case. Indeed, as shown below, it is not true with the more general
specification described in section 1.2.3 below.
1
1 General discussions of
demand with "rationing" are presented in Deaton and Muellbauer (1981)
and in Deaton (1981), with the discussion often in terms of indirect
utility or expenditure functions. Deaton shows that closed-form solu-
tions to constrained demand functions can be obtained in some cases
even when the utility function is not separable, the property that assures
a closed-form solution in the specification above.
The parameters bx and b2 are specified as functions of individual
attributes by
(7) bx
b2 = ®[XB2] ,
where X is a vector of individual characteristics and the J5's are vectors
of parameters to be estimated. The unit normal distribution function
<I> constrains bx and b2 to be between 0 and I.
1
2
To allow for random preferences for saving among individuals, pre-
sumably reflecting unmeasured individual attributes, the parameters ax
and a2 are allowed to be stochastic, with a bivariate normal distribution
(8) BVN
Large values of ax and a2 indicate high desired Sx and S2 respectively; large ax means lower desired 52 and large a2 lower desired Sx.
13
In addition, an alternative stochastic specification assumes that ax
and a2 are nonstochastic, but simple additive disturbance terms are
added to the unconstrained Sx and S2 equations. Details of the sto-
chastic structure under both specifications are presented in Venti and
Wise (1985b). An important parameter is the correlation between the
disturbance terms in St and S2. This correlation contributes to inference
about the extent to which observed saving behavior results from un-
measured individual-specific effects or the extent to which saving in
one form is offset by saving in another.
The possible outcomes and associated probability statements are
listed below, under the two interpretations of "savings and reserve
funds," denoted by S. If S includes IRAs, S = Sx + S2; if it does not,
S = S2.18 Steven F. Venti and David A. Wise
Outcome Probability:
If S = 5, + S2 If S = S2
sx = 0, S > 0 Pr[ 5, < 0 and S2 > 0] Pr[ 5, < 0 and S2 > 0]
0 < si < L, S > 0 JV[ 5, = 5, and S2 > -s{] Pr[ Si = sx and 52 > 0] 5j = L, S > 0 Pr[Si> L and 52 > -L] Pr[ 5, > L and S2 > 0]
s{ = 0, 5 < 0 Ptf 5i < 0 and 52 < 0] Pr[ 5, < 0 and 52 < 0]
0 < st < L, S < 0 iV[ S{ = 5, and 52 < -st] Pr[ Sx = sx and 52 < 0] si = L, S < 0 /V[ 5, > L and S2 < -L] Pr[ S{ > L and 52 < 0]
The latter interpretation is we believe the most likely to reflect the
respondent's intent. Most of the discussion and reported simulations
are based on this assumption. Nonetheless, we shall present some
estimates based on the S = Sx + S2 interpretation. This interpretation
should provide the most stable estimates.
1
4 We show that estimates
based on this interpretation are rather insensitive to important as-
sumptions. Estimates are obtained by maximum likelihood.
Implicit in the functional form described above is an "independence"
assumption that restricts the implied substitution between Si and S2
on the one hand and current consumption on the other. Consider the
allocation of a marginal dollar of current income before and after the




5, Ml - t) 0
52 b2 Ml - &i)
C \ - by- b2 (1 - bx - b2)l{\ - bx)
Thus the ratio of the marginal share that goes to S2 versus the share
that goes to consumption, b2l{\ — bx - b2), is independent of whether
the limit on 5! has been reached. One might expect, however, that this
ratio would increase after the limit is reached if there is greater sub-
stitution between Sx and S2 than between either of these and
consumption.
The importance of this property is what it implies about the effect
of an increase in the tax-deferred limit L on non-tax-deferred saving
S2. Only persons at the limit will be affected by increasing it. For these
people, dSJdL = 1. The amount that is taken from non-tax-deferred
saving to fund the dollar increase in S x is dS2/dL = -(1 - ?)&2/(l ~
bx), for those who are at the limit.
1
6 The amount from consumption is
-(1 — 0(1 ~ bi — b2)l{\ — bi). Thus the model implies a proportionate
reduction in S2 and C in accordance with the unconstrained shares.19 IRAs and Saving
Therefore results based on a functional form that allows more flexible
substitution between Si and S2 are also obtained.
1.2.3 Relaxing the Independence Assumption
To relax the restrictive substitution implications of the specification
above, suppose that preferred allocations of current income are in
accordance with the function
(9) V =[Y- T- P,5, - P2S2] ^{[a(Sy - ax)
k
+ (1 - a) (S2 - a2)4}* ,
where the left-hand term in brackets incorporates the budget constraint.
The cost of Si in terms of current consumption is Px and the cost of
S2 is P2. This function has a tree structure with one branch consumption
and the other saving. The two branches are combined in a Cobb-Douglas
manner with parameter p. The two forms of saving are combined in a
C.E.S. subfunction to form the saving branch. The parameter a indi-
cates the relative "preference" for Sj versus S2. If they were treated
as equivalent, a would equal .5.
1
7 The elasticity of substitution between
Si and S2 is 1/(1 - k).
1
8
The limiting case of (1) as k goes to zero is given by
(10) V = [Y - T - Si (1 - t) - S2Y~»[Si - aiMS2 - flaF-*,
with Pi = \ — t and P2 = 1. The unrestricted "desired" levels of Sx
and S2 are given by
(11) Si = at + JprtflY -T-(\ - t)ai - a2] ,
S2 = a2 + (1 - a)\3[Y - T - (1 - t)ax - a2] .
The function (10) is the same as the preference function (4) above and
yields the same constrained savings functions as those in equations (5)
and (6), but with bx = a|3 and b2 = (1 - a)p.
Because the parameters a and |3 have informative interpretations,
we shall estimate them as functions of X, as an alternative to estimation
of bx and b2. Although if bx, b2, a, and p were the same for all persons in the sample—not functions of attributes X—the equalities would hold,
they will not necessarily hold when each is estimated as a function of
X. For example, the mean over X of hx = 4>[A^] will not equal the
mean over X of d • p. Analagous to the parameterization of bx and b2,
we estimate a and p as
a = &[XA],
P = ®\XB],
where A and B are vectors of parameters to be estimated.20 Steven F. Venti and David A. Wise
With this parameterization, it is convenient to think of fi as the
marginal after-tax dollar devoted to saving (Sx and S2) and a as the
proportion of a saved dollar devoted to Sx. Define 7! = a/(l - r). It
is the amount of tax-deferred S! obtained for the proportion a, and




If k # 0, it is informative first to describe the saving functions in
terms of both Px and P2. In this case, the unconstrained desired levels
of Si and S2 are given by
(12) Si = ax + 7iP(r ~ T- Piai - P2a2) ,
S2 = a2 + 72(3(y - T - Piai - P2a2) .
From the constraint 7^ + y2P2 — 1, y2 = (1 - 71P1)//
>2. The dis-
tribution factory 7! is given by
(13) 71 =
P,(P,/a)*-> + P2[P2I(\ - a)]*-i
With P2 = 1 and 72 = 1 - I1P1, 71 can be written as
(14) 71 =
If k = 0, this expression reduces to alPx = a/(l - /) as in equation
(11).
If the Si constraint is binding so that Si = L, S2 is defined only
implicitly, by the relationship
(XS)
- ot)(S2 - a2)
k-
1
= (Y - T - PiL - P2S2)
obtained by maximizing (9) with respect to S2, with Si = L. This
function must be evaluated at each iteration of the maximum-likeli-
hood estimation routine. We have not attempted to do this with ran-
dom ax and a2. Only the additive disturbance specification has been
used in this case. Estimates based on the restricted specification
described in section 1.2.2, however, lead us to believe that the results
are not very sensitive ta which of these stochastic specifications is
used.
2
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1.3 Results
1.3.1 Data
The estimates are based on the 1983 Survey of Consumer Finances.
The Survey provides detailed information on asset balances of all kinds,
as well as on income and other personal attributes. From data on IRA
balances it is possible to infer 1982 contributions, as explained in the
appendix to this chapter. Unfortunately the data do not include changes
in other asset balances in 1982, as emphasized above. The absence of
this data has led us to concentrate on information contained in the
change in "savings and reserve funds" question.
Estimation is based on 1,068 observations. Families were deleted
from the original sample if they were ineligible for an IRA (self-
employed or not working). Nonresponse reduced the sample further.
The data most often missing were self-reported marginal tax rates
and the series of responses required to calculate housing equity. The
variable means in the estimation sample (table 1.17) are very close
to the means for all of those surveyed, however.
2
1 Estimates based
on a larger sample using predicted marginal tax rates are not ap-
preciably different from those reported below based on self-reported
rates.
1.3.2 Parameter Estimates
As emphasized above, the main concern is to obtain "reliable" es-
timates of/?! and b2 (or of a and p); they are the principle determinants
of the effect of a change in L on IRA and non-IRA saving. While the
effect of the variables X on the b's is of interest, it is not necessary to
obtain unbiased estimates of these effects to estimate the effect of
changing L. The model is intended to be structural with respect to L,
not necessarily with respect to the effects of the variables X that de-
termine the b's.
22 Given the limit L, the parameters ax and a2, and the
parameters bx and b2, Sx and S2 savings are given by the functions like those graphed in figure 1.1. Their amounts may be calculated given
after-tax income, Y — T. If the limit is increased by AL, the constrained
S2 function is shifted downward by -[(1 - i)b2l(\ - ^i)] * AL, using
equation (6), and its intersection (the kink point in figure 1) with the
unconstrained function is shifted outward. Given the new limit, new
5, and S2 values may be calculated. The effect of changing the limit
depends only on bx and b2. Thus in reporting the results we emphasize
the sensitivity of the estimated values of bx and b2 to model specifi-
cation. To simulate the average effect of a limit change, random values
of ax and a2 are selected from a bivariate normal distribution using the
estimated means and covariance terms. (The alternative specification22 Steven F. Venti and David A. Wise




We begin with estimates based on the limited substitution model with
bx and b2 parameterized (equations 5 and 6). Based on this specification
we shall first consider a base case with S - S2. We then discuss variants
of this specification, some under the assumption that S = Sx + S2.
The estimates with S = Si + S2 should in principle be the most stable.
We show in particular that the estimated values of <JX = CT2 are very
close and that the hypothesis that <JX = <r2 cannot be rejected. This is
a potentially important restriction that has been imposed under the
assumption that S = S2.
These latter estimates may be compared with those obtained with
k = 0 but with a and 3, instead of b1 and b2, parameterized. To provide
a summary measure that allows comparison across the specifications,
we present estimated values of Si and S2 saving out of the marginal
dollar of after-tax income, defined by
82 = b2 = (1 - ot)P ,
where the equalities hold only ifbx and b2, a and 3 are not parameterized.
Finally, estimates with k set at .65 are presented. In practice, widely
varying values of A: cannot be distinguished by the data.
2
4 Within-sample
predictions are essentially the same. Nonetheless the predicted effects
of limit changes do depend on the assumed substitution behavior under
which the data were generated. Thus we set k at a rather high level
and obtain estimates for the other parameters. Indications of model fit,
simulation results, and the sensitivity of the simulations to model spec-
ification follow.
Limited Substitution, bx and b2 Parameterized
a. The base specification. Parameter estimates obtained under the
assumption that S = S2 are shown in table 1.7. The correlation between
the random preference parameters ax and a2 is .47 (with a standard of
error of .06). The implied correlation between the Sx and S2 disturbance
terms is . 16, evaluated at the mean of the data. Although the correlation
is small, it is consistent with an individual-specific savings effect (pre-
sumably due to unmeasured individual attributes) that affects both IRA
and other saving in the same direction. It does not provide support for
the possibility that persons who save more in one form tend to save
less in the other. This substitution hypothesis would be consistent with
a negative correlation.23 IRAs and Saving
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The estimated coefficients on the wealth variables also seem con-
sistent with an individual-specific savings effect. Liquid assets, which
are likely to be the most readily transferred to IRA accounts, are
positively related to IRAs, but they are also positively related to other
saving. Indeed the relationship to the S2 saving is much greater than
the relationship to IRAs. A $1,000 increase in liquid assets is associated
with a $45 increase in S2, but only a $5 increase in 5]. Parameterization
in terms of a and p shows a positive relationship of liquid assets to
total saving in the two forms but a negative relationship to the pro-
portion of the total devoted to IRAs, as shown in table 1.8 below.
Nonliquid assets are negatively related to both Si and S2 saving. Par-
ameterization of a and (3 shows that nonliquid wealth is negatively
related to total saving in these forms, but is positively related to the24 Steven F. Venti and David A. Wise
proportion devoted to IRAs. (As shown in appendix table 1.20, total
wealth is negatively related to total saving in the Si and S2 forms, and
is unrelated to the allocation to Si versus S2.) Thus this evidence also
seems to support individual-specific saving preferences; some persons
are savers and others not, some save in liquid and others in less liquid
forms. But the evidence does not provide much support for the pos-




It is important to keep in mind that in this specification, cumulated
assets serve as a measure of individual-specific savings effects. They
are not intended to serve as exogenous determinants of the &'s; in this
sense they would be endogenous. But their relationship to the fs also
provides us with information about the hypothesis that IRA contri-
butions are simply taken from other saving balances.
The mean estimated bx and b2 parameters,. 174 and . 102 respectively,
also suggest a strong preference for IRA versus other saving. At the
margin, 17 cents of an additional dollar of after-tax income would go
to IRAs—yielding about 25 cents in IRA saving—and about 10 cents
would go to S2 saving.
It is tempting to explain the difference between bx and b2 by the
difference in the return to tax-deferred versus non-tax-deferred saving.
The revealed preference for IRAs is distinct from the lower price of
tax-deferred saving in terms of current consumption, which through
the current-year budget constraint of our model serves to increase the
amount of IRA saving, given bx and b2. For example, suppose that r
is the interest rate, t' is the marginal tax rate during the time that funds
are in an IRA account, t is the rate when funds are withdrawn, and
the contribution is made at age f and withdrawn at age j. A dollar
invested in an IRA yields 1 • (1 — t)e
lif~
J'
) • [1 - p(f)], where p(j) is a
penalty for early withdrawal. The penalty is 0 ifj > 59Vi and .1 if j <






the ratio of the tax-to non-tax-deferred yields is [(1 - t)l{\ - t')]e
rt^-
J)
• [1 - />(/)]• If t = t' and./ > 591/2, it is simply e
r«J-J'K Thus because
of the tax-free compounding of interest in IRA accounts, as well as the
possible difference between pre- and postretirement tax rates, persons




The penalty for early withdrawal makes the IRA less liquid and
thus may detract from the desirability of IRAs, however.
2
7 But the
liquidity consideration should be less important for people with higher
marginal tax rates. Taking account of the penalty for early withdrawal,
the tabulation below shows the number of years that funds must be
left in an IRA account for the return to exceed the non-tax-deferred






































Thus it is clear that both the interest rate and the marginal tax rate
should have a substantial effect on the desirability of IRAs to the extent
that short-term liquidity is an important consideration.
We are, however, unable to demonstrate convincingly an increasing
preference for IRAs with increasing marginal tax rates. The coefficient
on the marginal tax rate is significant in both bx and b2 when it is entered
as a determinant of the &'s. Indeed its estimated effect is somewhat
larger in b2 (see appendix table 1.22). Results with a and 0 parame-
terized show that the marginal tax rate is positively related to total
saving, p, but is negatively related to the proportion allocated to IRAs,
a. These results seem to suggest that the marginal tax rate is picking
up an individual-specific saving effect, but seems not related to a par-
ticular preference for IRAs. Wise (1984) was unable to identify an effect
of the marginal tax rate on tax-deferred saving in Canada, using pre-
cisely measured marginal tax rates, as opposed to the self-reported
rates used here.
2
8 While the marginal tax rate enters our budget con-
straint as the cost of Su the functional form virtually assures a positive
relationship between the tax rate and IRA saving. We do not estimate
a price parameter directly. Rather the price enters as a transformation
to the data. Indeed the likelihood function is somewhat higher if Px is
set to one for everyone, although the effect on the simulations reported
below is not substantial.
Thus, while difficult to demonstrate, we believe that the widespread
promotion of IRA accounts may be the most important reason for
increased saving through their use.
In addition, the estimates do not suggest more IRA saving among
persons without than with private pension plans, one of the primary
goals of IRA legislation. The coefficient on the pension variable (- .0140)
is not significantly different from zero. Furthermore, persons with pri-
vate pensions save more in the S2 form. Results based on the parame-
terization of a and p suggest that while persons without private plans
save less, they devote a larger proportion of what they do save to IRAs.
The apparent variation in saving behavior among occupations or
other segments of the population has been mentioned by others.
2
9 The
strong relationship of education to IRA saving is consistent with such
variation. In its relation to bu a year of education is equivalent to more26 Steven F. Venti and David A. Wise
than two years in age and more than $30,000 in liquid wealth. The
amount of the marginal dollar devoted to IRAs increases with age but
decreases with income.
b. Variants of the base specification. A potentially important restriction
in the base specification is that the error variances of ax and a2 are
equal. While this restriction is not necessary in principle, under the
assumption that S = S2 only the functional form and the limit L allow
identification of the variance of a2. Under the assumption that S = Sx
+ S2, direct evidence on the residual variance of S2 is provided. Es-
timates based on the assumption that "savings and reserve funds" S
include IRAs and allowing separate estimates of a! and a2 are presented
in appendix table 1.18. Both variances are estimated rather precisely
and are close in magnitude (dj = 8.84, <r2 = 5.45). Comparison with
estimates in appendix table 1.19 that restrict o^ to equal cr2 shows that
the two are not significantly different by a likelihood ratio test. The
other findings discussed above are not qualitatively affected if it is
assumed that S = Sx + S2, except that the residual correlation is now
not significantly different from zero.
3
0
Estimates like those in appendix table 1.18, but using total wealth
only, instead of liquid versus nonliquid wealth, show that total wealth
is in fact negatively related to total St and S2 saving and is unrelated
to the proportion allocated to Su as mentioned above (see appendix
table 1.20). Estimates comparable to appendix table 1.18, but with Px
= 1 for all persons (ignoring the marginal tax effect) are presented in
appendix table 1.21. The likelihood value indeed increases, but, as
shown below, conclusions about the effect of IRA limit changes are
not appreciably altered. Estimates with additive disturbances, instead
of random ai and a2, are shown in appendix table 1.23. The estimates
are very close to those in table 1.7 discussed above.
More Flexible Substitution, a and (3 Parameterized
a. With k = 0. Estimates with k = 0 are shown in table 1.8. They are
comparable to those in table 1.7, except that a and p, instead of bx
and b2, are parameterized, and additive disturbances, instead of random
ax and a2, are used. (Appendix table 1.23 shows results with bx and b2 parameterized and using additive disturbances.) Only estimates assum-
ing S = S2 are presented with the more flexible model.
3
1 The basic
conclusions are the same as those based on table 1.7. The mean hx is
.244 versus .247 in table 1.7; but the mean 82, .049, is somewhat smaller






























Estimates with a and P Parameterized, k = o















































This parameterization, however, indicates total Sy + S2 saving out
of marginal income by 3, and the share of the total to Si by a. Some
of the conclusions have been discussed above. In addition, the esti-
mates indicate that while total saving increases with age, the proportion
allocated to IRAs does not. The more educated save more but allocate
a smaller proportion to IRAs, according to these results. Thus it is
apparently their greater propensity to save rather than a greater pref-
erence for tax-deferred saving that leads to more IRA saving among
the educated. As mentioned above, while persons without private pen-
sion plans save less, these results indicate that they devote a larger
proportion of saving to IRAs. Thus it is apparently their lower pro-
pensity to save, rather than the same IRA preference as that of private
pension holders, that leads to comparable desired IRA contributions
among those with and without private pensions.28 Steven F. Venti and David A. Wise
































































































b. With k = .65. Estimates with k set at .65 are shown in table 1.9.
The individual parameter estimates are very close to those with A; =
0, with the exception of the constant terms in a and £. Again, differ-
ences are summarized in the hx and 82 measures. The mean hx is .213
when k = .65, and .244 with k = 0. The mean 82 estimates are .028
and .049 respectively.
The effect of a change in the IRA limit depends in large part on the
difference between the share of marginal income allocated to S2 by
people who are not constrained by the limit and the share allocated to
S2 by those who are constrained by the limit. These shares are denoted











.09629 IRAs and Saving
Thus the predicted relative shift to S2 when the constraint is reached
is greater when the data are assumed to have been generated by in-
dividual saving behavior with greater substitution between Si and 52.
This is reflected in greater reduction in S2 for the k — .65 model when
the IRA limit is raised than for the k = 0 model, as indicated in the
simulations below.
1.3.3 The Model Fit
Although there is some variation in the model fit by specification,
the differences are quite small. Thus we present comparison of pre-
dicted versus actual values for three illustrative cases. Based on the
k = 0 model, with a and p parameterized, table 1.10 shows simulated
versus actual values of the proportion of respondents with Sx > 0,























































































































































a. Based on 10 draws per sample observation.
b. Y-T, in thousands of dollars.
c. Predicted 5 > 0, given predicted sx = L.
d. Observed in the sample.
e. Predicted S > 0, given predicted 5, < 0.30 Steven F. Venti and David A. Wise
the proportions with S > 0 conditional on s, = L (at the IRA limit) and
with S > 0 conditional on Sl < 0 (no IRA). Overall the fit is very close.
In particular, the model seems not to underestimate the S2 saving of
persons who are at the IRA limit, as might be expected if not enough
substitution of S2 for Sx were allowed by the model when the Si limit
is reached. But this simulation shows some overprediction of S2 saving
for persons below the IRA limit. The simulated predictions are based
on only 10 draws per person, however, so they reflect some random
variation.
3
2 While unconditional overall proportions will match the ac-
tual values closely, nothing in the specifications assures a close fit by
income interval. The model overpredicts saving of low-income persons.
This is a characteristic of all of the specifications.
This overprediction is eliminated if the disturbance terms are allowed
to be heteroskedastic, with the variance increasing with income, by
specifying €.t = nxY + ex and e2 = n2Y + e2P The fit based on this model with k = 0 is shown in table 1.11, where it can be seen that the
predicted and actual proportions are very close for all income groups.
Finally, illustrative predictions with k = .65 are shown in table 1.12.
The predicted versus actual values are very similar to those in the
k - 0 case, although if anything the predicted proportion of those at
the limit with S > 0 is somewhat lower than in the k = 0 case.
3
4
Predictions with bx and b2 parameterized are shown in appendix table
1.24, based on the estimates in table 1.7. This specification tends to
predict a lower portion of those at the limit with S > 0 than the model
with a and p parameterized.
1.3.4 Simulations of the Effect of IRA Limit Changes
To estimate the effect of IRAs on saving, we have predicted the effect
of limit changes on IRA contributions and on other saving. To add
content to this exercise, we have simulated the effects of several re-
cently proposed limit changes. The first we call the Treasury Plan.
3
5
It would increase the limit for an employed person from $2,000 to
$2,500, and would increase the limit for a nonworking spouse from
$250 to $2,500. Thus, for example, the contribution limit for a husband
and nonworking wife would increase from $2,250 to $5,000. A Modified
Treasury Plan increases the limit for an employed person from $2,000
to $2,500, but only increases the limit for a nonworking spouse from
$250 to $500. Finally, the President's Plan would leave the limit for an
employed person at $2,000, but would raise the limit for a nonworking
spouse from $250 to $2,000.
3
6 For comparison, simulated savings under
the current limit are also shown.
The predicted changes should be interpreted as indications of changes



















Simulated Predicted vs. Actual Values,
k
by Income Interval,





































































































































a. Based on 10 draws per sample observation.
b. Y-T, in thousands of dollars.
c. Predicted S > 0, given predicted st = L.
d. Observed in the sample.
e. Predicted 5 > 0, given predicted Si < 0.
in mind that S2 saving undoubtedly excludes changes in nonliquid wealth
such as housing. The possible substitution betwen IRAs and housing
wealth in the long run, for example, would not be reflected in these
estimates. They are intended, however, to indicate the extent to which
IRA contributions in 1982 were simply a substitute for other forms of
saving, other than nonliquid assets. The top portion of the table pertains
to individuals who are predicted to be at the IRA limit, since it is only
this group that would be affected by an increase in the limit. The bottom
portion shows simulated contributions by family type. The simulations
are based on the estimation sample. Those in table 1.13 are based on
the estimates in table 1.7 and those in table 1.14 on the k = .65 estimates
shown in table 1.9. The simulated values are based on 10 random draws
for each observation in the estimation sample.32 Steven F. Venti and David A. Wise
The predicted changes in Si and S2 under the Treasury Plan for











These values suggest that only 10-20% of the IRA increase is offset
by a reduction in other financial assets. Thus, at least in the short run,
tax-deferred IRA accounts have by these estimates led to a relatively
large increase in total individual saving (as denned in this paper).
Possibly the best indicator of saving is change in consumption. The
average change in "consumption" (as defined implicitly in this paper)





















































% S > 0







































































































a. Based on 10 draws per sample observation.
b. Y-T, in thousands of dollars.
c. Predicted S > 0, given predicted st = L.
d. Observed in the sample.
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in taxes. For example, the simulated changes under the Treasury Plan





























Thus possibly 50% of the IRA increase is funded by a reduction in
consumption, according to these measures, and possibly 35% by re-























Simulated Changes in Savings, Consumption, and Taxes, by Plan














































































































(34.8)36 Steven F. Venti and David A. Wise
The estimated IRA increases can be compared with estimates by
Venti and Wise (1985) based on 1983 Current Population Survey (CPS)
data. The CPS data reported actual 1982 IRA contributions by interval,
while 1982 contributions had to be inferred from balances reported in
the SCR In addition, self-reported marginal tax rates were used here,
while estimated rates were used in conjunction with the CPS data.
Nonetheless the simulated effects of limit increases are virtually the
same. For example, for all families the simulated increase under the
Treasury Plan is 27% versus 30% based on the CPS data. The increase
for unmarried heads is 19% versus 19% based on the CPS; it is 80%
versus 79% for married one-earner families; and 16% versus 16% for
married two-earner families.
1.3.5 Sensitivity of Results to Model Specification
The sensitivity of the results to selected specification changes is
shown in table 1.16. Possibly the best summary indicator of the effect
of these changes is the simulated change in 52 under the Treasury Plan.
In each case, the decline in 52 is small relative to the increase in IRAs,
although the magnitude of the decline in 52 varies by a factor of 4.
None of the specification changes has much effect on the simulated
IRA change. If it is assumed that 5 = 5! + 52, the estimated reduction
in 52 tends to be larger, except where Pt is set to 1. In the latter case,
the constrained estimate 82 of 82 is larger because 4/(1 - 4) is larger.









k — 0; a, p parameterized;
additive errors
k = .65; a, (3 parameterized;
additive errors



































Treasury Plan Effect for
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1.4 Conclusions
Increasing the IRA limits would lead to substantial increases in tax-
deferred saving according to our evidence, based on the 1983 Survey
of Consumer Finances. For example, the recent Treasury Plan would
increase IRA contributions by about 30%. Virtually the same estimate
was obtained in previous analysis based on Current Population Survey
data, suggesting that this conclusion may be relatively robust. The
primary focus of this paper, however, has been the effect of limit in-
creases on other saving. How much of the IRA increase would be offset
by reduction in non-tax-deferred saving? The weight of our evidence
suggests that very little of the increase would be offset by reduction
in other financial assets, possibly 10-20%, maybe less. Our estimates
suggest that 45-55% of the IRA increase would be funded by reduction
in consumption, and about 35% by reduced taxes.
The analysis rests on a preference structure recognizing the con-
straint that the IRA limit places on the allocation of current income.
The model fits the data well and in particular distinguishes accurately
the savings decisions of persons at the IRA limit versus the decisions
of those who are not.
The greatest potential uncertainty about the results and the greatest
statistical complication for analysis stems from the limited information
on non-IRA saving and from the consequent difficulty of obtaining
direct estimates of the degree of substitution between tax-deferred and
non-tax-deferred saving. We have addressed these issues by considering
the sensitivity of our conclusions to specification changes, including
assumptions about the interpretation of key variables and the extent
of substitution underlying observed saving outcomes. Although the
magnitude of the estimated reduction in other saving, with increases
in the IRA limit, is sensitive to specification changes, the reduction as
a percentage of the IRA increase is invariably small.
In addition to these primary conclusions, our evidence suggests sub-
stantial variation in saving behavior among segments of the population.
We also find that IRAs do not serve as a substitute for private pension
plans, although persons without private plans devote a larger propor-
tion of their lower total saving to IRAs. Thus the legislative goal of
disproportionately increasing retirement saving among persons without
pension plans is apparently not being realized. But the more general
goal of increasing individual saving is.38 Steven F. Venti and David A. Wise
Appendix
Imputing 1982 IRA Contributions
The Survey of Consumer Finances (SCF) asked respondents if they
had any IRA accounts and the total dollar value in all of them. The
SCF did not ask respondents for their 1982 contribution. Given that
the Economic Recovery Tax Act liberalized eligibility beginning in 1982
(nearly three-quarters of all 1982 accounts were opened in 1982), the
following criteria are used to impute 1982 contributions:
(a) If the total value of IRAs is less than the 1982 family limit then
the total value is assumed to be the 1982 contribution.
(b) If the total value of IRAs exceeds the 1982 family limit then
the family limit is assumed to be the 1982 contribution.
Imputed IRA contributions based on this procedure compare favorably
to evidence from the CPS, which presents 1982 contributions by interval.
Table 1.17 Summary Statistics for Estimation Subsample
Variable
Total after-tax












































































a. Total after-tax income is obtained by using the reported marginal tax rate and inferred
filing status to calculate (using 1982 tax tables) the taxes paid by each family, and
subtracting this amount from total income.
b. The wealth variables are defined in note 4 to this chapter.
c. For two worker families the variable is unity if either member participates in a pension
plan, and zero otherwise.Table 1.18 Parameter Estimates with b\ and








Correlation of a\, a2
S.D. of Si (at mean)
S.D. of S2 (at mean)
Correlation of Si, S2



















































Table 1.19 Parameter Estimates with b\ and 62 Parameterized
S






























Correlation of au a2
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Table 1.20 Parameter Estimates with b







Correlation of ax, a2
S.D. of Si (at mean)
S.D. of S2 (at mean)
Correlation of Su S2











i and 02 Parameterized,
i =£ a2, using Total
yWealth
Assuming that










































.1174 (.6683)Table 1.20 (continued)
Variable

































Table 1.21 Parameter Estimates with bi and b2 Parameterized, Assuming that







Correlation of a!, a2
S.D. of Si (at mean)
S.D. of S2 (at mean)
Correlation of Si, S2






















i *• <r2 and P\ = 1



















































-1363Table 1.22 Parameter Estimates with bx and b2 Parameterized, Assuming that







Correlation of au a2
S.D. of Si (at mean)
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Table 1.23 Parameter Estimates with bx and b% Parameterized, 5 = 52,
Additive Disturbance






Correlation of a\, a2
S.D. of Si (at mean)
S.D. of S2 (at mean)





.15 (.06)Table 1.23 (continued)
Variable


























































































































































































































































a. Based on 10 draws per sample observation, and on the parameter estimates in text
table 1.7.
b. Y-T, in thousands of dollars.
c. Predicted S > 0, given predicted si = L.
d. Observed in the sample.
e. Predicted S > 0, given predicted Si < 0.
Notes
1. Self-employed persons have been excluded from the analysis.
2. Numbers based on CPS data (Venti and Wise [1985]) indicate a higher
proportion of wage earners with IRAs. While the CPS data are weighted to
represent the employed population, the SCF data reported here are weighted
to represent families with a wage earner.
3. Three responses were possible: (1) Put more money in. (2) Stayed the
same. (3) Took more money out.
4. This evidence is consistent with the widespread perception that individual
savings rates in the United States have been unusually low in recent years and
that consumer debt has been increasing. See, for example, New York Times,
29 October 1985; Boston Globe, 15 September and 22 November 1985.
5. The following breakdown of wealth is used throughout this paper:
Liquid assets: checking accounts, certificates of deposit, savings accounts,
money market accounts, savings bonds
Other financial assets: stocks, bonds, trusts
IRAs and Keoghs: balances
Other assets: value of home, other property and receivables
Debt: mortgage and consumer debt
Total wealth is the sum of the first four categories minus debt. Wealth does
not include the cash value of life insurance, the value of motor vehicles, and
pension and Social Security wealth.
6. The median for all financial assets is 1.3 when stocks and bonds are
included, versus 1.2 when they are excluded. For more detail, see Venti and
Wise (1986).
7. Weighted by the number of IRA contributors.
8. For most purposes it is not necessary to specify two behavioral equations:
one describing contributor status and the other the amount.
9. In practice the marginal tax rate is not constant, but incorporating this
nonlinearity into the budget constraint would greatly increase the complexity
of the analysis and, we believe, would not appreciably affect the results, given
the small potential IRA contributions relative to income.
10. While we use the decision function simply to provide consistent functional
forms for the constrained and unconstrained S2 functions, there is some prec-
edent for including asset (saving) balances in a true utility function. See for45 IRAs and Saving
example Sidrauski (1967), Fischer (1979), Calvo (1979), Obstfeld (1984, 1985),
and Poterba and Rotemberg (1986). With ax and a2 random, as described below,
annual Sx and S2 flows could be thought of as proxies for balances.
11. A similar situation characterizes the specification used by Hausman and
Ruud (1984), for example, to describe family labor supply. Their specification
yields unconstrained closed-form solutions to the labor supply functions of the
husband and the wife, consistent with an indirect utility function. But con-
strained functions analogous to ours are only defined implicitly.
12. Thus, for example, bx = f™
lvdv, where v is a standard normal variable.
In practice, very few predicted bx or b2 values are below zero, if the constraint
is not imposed.
13. dSx/bax = 1 - bx, dS2/da2 = 1 - b2 , dSx/ba2 = -Ml - t), dS2/bax = -b2{\ - t). 14. To determine the magnitude of S2, not just its sign, it is necessary to
identify its residual variance. In many situations similar to this, identification
of both <r2 and <rx would not be possible given only qualitative information on
S2, its sign. In this case, however, identification is in principle provided by
three features of the model: (1) the functional form itself; (2) the limit L on Sx;
and (3) by direct information on the value of S2 in addition to its sign, if "savings
and reserve funds" is interpreted to include IRAs. For more detail, see Venti
and Wise (1986).
15. A dollar of current after-tax income allocated to Sx yields Sx/(l - 0 in
tax-deferred saving.
16. This effect can be seen from figure 1.1. The effect of changing the limit
is to shift downward the function S2 described by the steeper-sloped segment
of the S2 function and the dashed extension of it.
17. In this case, with Px = P2, desired Sx would equal desired S2, as can be seen from equation (14) below.
18. This specification is thus a slight variant of the "S-branch" utility tree
of Brown and Heien (1972). See also Blackorby, Boyce, and Russell [1978].
19. The a, P parameterization essentially allows interactions between the X
variables and thus the difference in the two parameterizations is more than
just interpretation. Setting a = b\l{bx + b2), 3
 = bx + b2, and parameterizing
b\ and b2 would yield results the same as the section 1.2.2 specification.
20. Similar evidence for the k = 0 case is presented in Venti and Wise (1986),
but with a and 3, instead of bx and b2, parameterized.
21. For example, mean wealth is $59,781 in the estimation sample and is
$59,090 in the total sample, mean age is 37.7 versus 39.4, mean education is
13.4 versus 12.2, and the mean self-reported marginal tax rate is 0.25 versus
0.27.
22. Using the regression analogy, it is equivalent to obtaining an unbiased
estimate of E(Y\X), where Y = Xb + e, rather than unbiased estimates of each
component of b.
23. A potentially important assumption is the presumed distribution of the
random terms. The results below show that the model fits the observed data
well by income interval, and this provides some support for the distributional
assumptions. A better test would be to use the model to predict the effect of
a limit change. While this is not possible for the United States, such predictions
have been made for Canadian tax-deferred saving contributions using a spec-
ification similar to the one used here for IRA contributions. The model esti-
mated using data from one year predicted very accurately the contributions in
a later year with a 60% lower contribution limit, and vice versa. See Wise
(1984, 1985). The results are also summarized in Venti and Wise (1985).46 Steven F. Venti and David A. Wise
24. Similar findings are reported by Mundlak (1975) and by Griliches and
Ringstad (1971) with respect to production data. In our case, the likelihood
function is very flat around k = 0.
25. It is not possible to reach strong conclusions based on this evidence
because the asset balances are reported after an IRA contribution and because
it is not clear what the relationship should be if liquid assets, say, are larger
than the IRA limit. But if liquid assets were relatively large at the end of the
period, one might suppose that they were large when the IRA decision was
made. One might also suppose that the larger the liquid asset balances, the
easier it would be to forgo liquidity and to put money in an IRA.
26. It is also informative to consider the cost, in terms of current consump-
tion, of providing retirement income. Suppose, thinking in a manner roughly
consistent with statements of some pension planners, an individual wants to
accumulate a given retirement fund by age./ > 59
1/2. If the amount accumulated
through Si saving is to be equivalent to that accumulated through S2 saving,
5^1 - t)e?v-ft = S2(l - f')eKi-rw-A The amount of required S2 relative to
S, would be S2/Si = [(1 - t)l{\ - t')]e
rt<J-J'\ The cost in terms of current
consumption is given by (52/5i) = [C2/Ci(l - t')], where C represents current
consumption cost. Thus
eye, = [l - 0/(1 - nwv-n. lft = t',
C2/C{ = [1/(1 - t')]e"V-tK
This is of course another way of emphasizing the IRA advantage. But it also
suggests that the income effect created by the lower IRA cost could in theory
lead to greater consumption, although the parameter estimates themselves,
together with the simulations presented below, are inconsistent with this con-
ceptual possibility.
27. We say "may" because the nonliquid aspect of the IRA may well be a
positive attribute for some individuals, in spite of standard presumptions about
"rational" behavior.
28. Wise (1984) contains analysis of Canadian tax-deferred Registered Re-
tirement Saving Plans. In general, we have found that the estimated effect of
the marginal tax rate is very sensitive to functional form. See also Wise (1985)
and Venti and Wise (1985). King and Leape (1984) also mention the difficulty
of isolating the effect of the marginal tax rate, and they conclude, "contrary
to much of the recent literature, that taxes do not play a decisive role in
explaining the difference in portfolio composition across households."
29. See, for example, the survey by King (1985).
30. It can be shown that if 5 = S2 but it is assumed that S = St + S2, the estimated variance of 52 will be biased downward. In addition, the estimated
residual correlation between Si and S2
 wiH be biased downward.
31. Results with S = Si + S2 are presented in Venti and Wise (1986).
32. In eight different simulations with 10 draws per person in each, the
average of the predicted proportion of those with S > 0, given Si = L, was
.676.
33. Similar results were obtained by Wise (1984, 1985) using Canadian data,
and by Venti and Wise (1985) using Current Population Survey data.
34. The average over 8 simulations with 10 draws per person in each was
.656, versus .676 in the k = 0 case. The average over 3 simulations with 50
draws per person in each was .652.
35. See U.S. Department of Treasury (1984).
36. See U.S. President (1985).47 IRAs and Saving
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Comment Angus Deaton
I must begin by congratulating the authors on a very brave attempt to
do what is probably impossible, to estimate the effects on total saving
of increasing the ceiling on IRA contributions, and to do so using only
a single cross section of data. Moreover, the data are far from ideal in
other respects, particularly in that there is no information on the amounts
saved other than in IRAs, but only on whether individuals put money
in or took money out of their total savings and reserve funds. All the
more remarkable then that Venti and Wise manage to estimate the
fraction of IRA contributions that come from a reduction in consump-
tion, i.e., from "new" saving, and the fraction that come from a decline
in other assets. The results suggest that a large fraction of IRAs are at
the expense of current consumption, so that any increase in the max-
imum contribution allowed would exert very powerful effects on the
total amount of saving. For example, Venti and Wise calculate (table
1.13, and sec. 1.3.4) that the adoption of the Treasury Plan with an
extension of the current limits of $2,000 for a working and $250 for a
nonworking spouse to $2,500 for both would generate $1,138 per house-
hold of additional IRA contributions, of which only $94 would come
from a reduction in other saving. The princely sum of $643 would come
from a reduction in consumption, with the federal government making
up the rest through a reduction in taxes of $401. Are these numbers
plausible? Quite possibly, particularly if we believe that IRAs appeal
to individuals who would not otherwise save, and who are persuaded
to adopt IRA plans by the very intensive advertising and commercial
pressures that seem to accompany the schemes. However, this is not
the story that is given in the paper, which adopts a much more standard
Angus Deaton is a professor of economics and international affairs at the Woodrow
Wilson School, Princeton University, and a research associate of the National Bureau
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approach whereby IRAs provide limited access to a very high yield
form of saving. If this is the way things work, and it is the natural first
approach for an economist to adopt, then I think that the results are
extremely implausible, given the other things that we know about saving
behavior. Venti and Wise adopt a straightforward model in which utility
is linked to consumption on the one hand and to savings on the other,
the latter modeled as a CES composite of IRA saving and saving in
other assets. Since such a model allows two-stage separable budgeting;
changes in the IRA limitations act only through the savings branch of
the utility function. I find it helpful to think of the effects on con-
sumption in terms of price effects; an increase in the amount permitted
to be saved in an IRA, which carries a very attractive rate of return,
effectively raises the rate of return on saving as a whole. The increase
in the effective rate will depend positively on the tax bracket of the
household, and will be very small for households that pay little or no
tax. Since my reading of the literature is that consumption is not very
sensitive to the real interest rate, I find it difficult to believe that the
modest increase in rates provided by raising the IRA ceiling could
possibly generate the very large falls in consumption found in the paper.
Indeed, the authors find themselves "unable to demonstrate convinc-
ingly an increasing preference for IRAs with increasing marginal tax
rates." Hence, if IRA saving is generated by the same forces that
generate other saving, I would expect that an increase in the ceiling
on IRA contributions would leave consumption more or less unchanged
or would increase it, since individuals can now attain the same standard
of living after retirement at less cost in 'terms of present consumption
forgone. I would expect IRA saving to increase quite considerably, but
I would expect most of the increase to be financed by a decline in other
assets. The quite different conclusions of the paper may well be correct
as estimates of what would actually happen, but they are not consistent
with the general framework that is used in the paper.
How then did the results come about, and in what way do they
implicitly contradict the standard results on saving, consumption, and
income? One possibility is the old problem of what happens when
saving is regressed on income in a single cross section, and what it
tells us, or better does not tell us, about the effects over time of income
growth on savings rates. In spite of its utility formulation, and largely
because of the limitations of a single cross-sectional survey, the model
of this paper is essentially an old-fashioned Keynesian model in which
saving is a linear function of income. Because a great deal of saving,
including IRA saving, is done by people with relatively high incomes,
a regression of saving on income yields a high marginal propensity to
save, and so it is here. Although what is being estimated is far from
being a simple linear regression, we still get, in table 1.7, an estimated50 Steven F. Venti and David A. Wise
marginal propensity to save on IRAs and other saving together of 0.65,
i.e. (1 — hi — 82) in the table. Almost no modern work on the con-
sumption function would support an estimate this low, and there are
many standard reasons why we would expect the cross-sectional cor-
relation to be misleading (permanent and transitory income effects,
individual fixed effects, and so on). Recent econometric work may
have cast some shadows on parts of permanent income and life-cycle
theory, but I doubt that a return to the textbook Keynesian consumption
function is a real step forward.
The high estimated marginal propensity to save is part of the story.
Also important is the elasticity of substitution between IRAs and other
forms of saving. Unfortunately, the data are not capable of providing
a precise estimate of this important quantity, and the conclusions are
sensitive to the value that is assumed. If more substitution is allowed
than in the baseline case, more of the increase in IRAs comes out of
other assets (see the righthand panel of the table on page 00), and
presumably the data are consistent with even larger effects.
There are two more econometric issues that should perhaps be put
in the record. First, I am unhappy about the precise status of the
explanatory variables in the analysis. The authors (rightly) make much
of the existence of unobservable fixed effects that determine each
household's attitudes to saving—the "Protestant ethic" effects—and
the estimated positive influence of wealth on saving is ascribed to the
correlation between wealth and these omitted effects. However, wealth
will only be an imperfect proxy, and it is hard to believe that the other
variables, and in particular income, are independent of the fixed effects.
If so, the explanatory variables are not exogenous and there will be a
complicated pattern of biases. The authors are aware of this and tell
us that "it is not necessary to obtain unbiased estimates ... to estimate
the effect of changing L. The model is intended to be structural with
respect to L, not necessarily with respect to the effects of the variables
X that determine the 6's." I find it difficult to interpret the second
sentence, and, while the first is clearly true, I should have welcomed
some proof that the effects of changing the limit are consistently es-
timated in view of these acknowledged econometric problems. Second,
I should like to register a mild protest at the way most of the variables
have been entered into the analysis. Parameterization is generally re-
stricted to the marginal propensities to consume, and this has the effect
that a whole group of variables (wealth, age, education, etc.) appear
only through their interactions with income. I see no reason to restrict
the analysis to what would normally be considered second-order ef-
fects, ignoring the first-order effects of the levels of the variables.
I should like to conclude by summarizing what I think are the sub-
stantive achievements of the paper. First, on a methodological level,51 IRAs and Saving
this is a very clever piece of applied econometrics. Great subtlety is
required to extract the relevant magnitudes from a rather unpromising
data set, and the authors have provided exactly that in a clean and
elegant piece of econometric analysis. Second, and more substantively,
they have produced a stylized "fact" that raising the IRA contribution
ceiling would generate a substantial volume of new saving, not just a
rearrangement of existing assets. I suspect that this fact is right, es-
pecially if it is true that many households save only through IRA ac-
counts. Why this should be so is still very much an open question, and
I find it hard to reconcile the explanation in the paper with the other
things that we know about household saving. But there are many such
phenomena that do not seem to be easily explained by conventional
theory. And even at a very simple level, table 1.2 tells us that only
54% of families with annual income above $100,000 have IRA accounts,
a fact that in itself is not easily explained.